WASHINGTON (AP) — Ten years and $60 billion in Americantaxpayer funds later, Iraq is still so
unstable and broken that even itsleaders question whether U.S. efforts to rebuild the war-torn
nationwere worth the cost.In his final report to Congress, SpecialInspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction Stuart Bowen’s conclusion wasall too clear: Since the invasion a decade ago this month,
the U.S. hasspent too much money in Iraq for too few results.Thereconstruction effort "grew to a
size much larger than was everanticipated," Bowen told The Associated Press in a preview of his
lastaudit of U.S. funds spent in Iraq, to be released Wednesday. "Not enoughwas accomplished for
the size of the funds expended."Ininterviews with Bowen, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said the
U.S.funding "could have brought great change in Iraq" but fell short toooften. "There was
misspending of money," said al-Maliki, a Shiite Muslimwhose sect makes up about 60 percent of
Iraq’s population.IraqiParliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, the country’s top Sunni Muslimofficial, told
auditors that the rebuilding efforts "had unfavorableoutcomes in general.""You think if
you throw money at a problem,you can fix it," Kurdish government official Qubad Talabani, son
ofIraqi president Jalal Talabani, told auditors. "It was just notstrategic thinking."The
abysmal Iraq results forecast what couldhappen in Afghanistan, where U.S. taxpayers have so far spent
$90billion in reconstruction projects during a 12-year military campaignthat, for the most part, ends in
2014.Shortly after the March2003 invasion, Congress set up a $2.4 billion fund to help ease thesting of
war for Iraqis. It aimed to rebuild Iraq’s water andelectricity systems; provide food, health care and
governance for itspeople; and take care of those who were forced from their homes in thefighting. Fewer
than six months later, President George W. Bush askedfor $20 billion more to further stabilize Iraq and
help turn it into anally that could gain economic independence and reap global investments.Todate, the
U.S. has spent more than $60 billion in reconstruction grantsto help Iraq get back on its feet after the
country that has beenbroken by more than two decades of war, sanctions and dictatorship. Thatworks out
to about $15 million a day.And yet Iraq’s governmentis rife with corruption and infighting. Baghdad’s
streets are stillcowed by near-daily deadly bombings. A quarter of the country’s 31million population
lives in poverty, and few have reliable electricityand clean water.Overall, including all military and
diplomaticcosts and other aid, the U.S. has spent at least $767 billion since theAmerican-led invasion,
according to the Congressional Budget Office.National Priorities Project, a U.S. research group that
analyzes federaldata, estimated the cost at $811 billion, noting that some funds arestill being spent on
ongoing projects.Sen. Susan Collins, amember of the Senate committee that oversees U.S. funding, said
the Bushadministration should have agreed to give the reconstruction money toIraq as a loan in 2003
instead as an outright gift."It’s been anextraordinarily disappointing effort and, largely, a
failed program,"Collins, R-Maine, said in an interview Tuesday. "I believe, had themoney been
structured as a loan in the first place, that we would haveseen a far more responsible approach to how
the money was used, andlower levels of corruption in far fewer ways."In numerousinterviews with
Iraqi and U.S. officials, and though multiple examplesof thwarted or defrauded projects, Bowen’s report
laid bare a trail ofwaste, including:—In Iraq’s eastern Diyala province, a crossroadsfor Shiite
militias, Sunni insurgents and Kurdish squatters, the U.S.began building a 3,600-bed prison in 2004 but
abandoned the projectafter three years to flee a surge in violence. The half-completed KhanBani Sa’ad
Correctional Facility cost American taxpayers $40 million butsits in rubble, and Iraqi Justice Ministry
officials say they have noplans to ever finish or use it.—Subcontractors for Anham LLC,based in Vienna,
Va., overcharged the U.S. government thousands ofdollars for supplies, including $900 for a control
switch valued at$7.05 and $80 for a piece of pipe that costs $1.41. Anham was hired tomaintain and
operate warehouses and supply centers near Baghdad’sinternational airport and the Persian Gulf port at
Umm Qasr.— A$108 million wastewater treatment center in the city of Fallujah, aformer al-Qaida
stronghold in western Iraq, will have taken eight yearslonger to build than planned when it is completed
in 2014 and will onlyservice 9,000 homes. Iraqi officials must provide an additional $87million to hook
up most of the rest of the city, or 25,000 additionalhomes.—After blowing up the al-Fatah bridge in
north-central Iraqduring the invasion and severing a crucial oil and gas pipeline, U.S.officials decided
to try to rebuild the pipeline under the Tigris Riverat a cost of $75 million. A geological study
predicted the project mightfail, and it did: Eventually, the bridge and pipelines were repaired atan
additional cost of $29 million.—A widespread ring of fraudled by a former U.S. Army officer resulted in
tens of millions ofdollars in kickbacks and the criminal convictions of 22 people connectedto government
contracts for bottled water and other supplies at theIraqi reconstruction program’s headquarters at Camp
Arifjan, Kuwait.Intoo many cases, Bowen concluded, U.S. officials did not consult withIraqis closely or
deeply enough to determine what reconstructionprojects were really needed or, in some cases, wanted. As
a result,Iraqis took limited interest in the work, often walking away fromhalf-finished programs,
refusing to pay their share, or failing tomaintain completed projects once they were handed
over.DeputyPrime Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, a Shiite, described the projectsas well intentioned,
but poorly prepared and inadequately supervised.Themissed opportunities were not lost on at least 15
senior State andDefense department officials interviewed in the report, includingambassadors and
generals, who were directly involved in rebuilding Iraq.Onekey lesson learned in Iraq, Deputy Secretary
of State William Burnstold auditors, is that the U.S. cannot expect to "do it all and do itour way.
We must share the burden better multilaterally and engage thehost country constantly on what is truly
needed."Army Chief ofStaff Ray Odierno, who was the top U.S. military commander in Iraq from2008 to
2010, said "it would have been better to hold off spending largesums of money" until the
country stabilized.About a third of the$60 billion was spent to train and equip Iraqi security forces,
whichhad to be rebuilt after the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authoritydisbanded Saddam’s army in
2003. Today, Iraqi forces have varyingsuccesses in safekeeping the public and only limited ability to
securetheir land, air and sea borders.The report also cites DefenseSecretary Leon Panetta as saying that
the 2011 withdrawal of Americantroops from Iraq weakened U.S. influence in Baghdad. Panetta has
sinceleft office when former Sen. Chuck Hagel took over the defense job lastweek. Washington is eyeing a
similar military drawdown next year inAfghanistan, where U.S. taxpayers have spent $90 billion so far
onrebuilding projects.The Afghanistan effort risks falling into thesame problems that mired Iraq if
oversight isn’t coordinated better. InIraq, officials were too eager to build in the middle of a civil
war,and too often raced ahead without solid plans or back-up plans, thereport concluded.Most of the work
was done in piecemeal fashion,as no single government agency had responsibility for all of the
moneyspent. The State Department, for example, was supposed to overseereconstruction strategy starting
in 2004, but controlled only about 10percent of the money at stake. The vast majority of the projects —
75percent — were paid for by the Defense Department.___Online:Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction: http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/index.html___Follow
Lara Jakes on Twitter at https://twitter.com/larajakesAPCopyright
2013 The Associated Press.